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Introduction 
The development of the modern investment treaty regime represents one of the most remarkable 
extensions of international law in the post-war period. Largely built on a network of over 3,000 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), a handful of 
plurilateral investment treaties,1 as well as customary international law, foreign investors are 
granted beneficiary rights aimed at the protection of their investments. While each international 
investment agreement (IIA) is a stand-alone agreement with considerable diversity, agreements 
typically include: prohibition against expropriation without adequate compensation, full 
protection and security, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, most-favored nation 
treatment, free transfer of capital and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. 
Combined, it has been claimed that ‘no other category of private individuals’ is ‘given such 
expansive rights in international law as are private actors investing across borders.’2  
Primarily, however, the development of this regime is not exceptional solely for the 
expansiveness of the substantive rights granted to foreign investors under IIAs, but is rather the 
combination of such rights with the robustness of the ISDS mechanisms offered to foreign 
investors. Investment treaty arbitration (ITA), as permitted under the majority of IIAs in force, 
grants beneficiary rights to foreign investors for the initiation of arbitral claims against the state 
hosting their investments without the consent of their home state or the requirement (in almost 
all cases) to first exhaust domestic remedies.  
ITA is thus distinct in relation to many of the other standing international courts 
presented in this volume; and because of this decentralized structure – combined with a striking 
number of disputes that have emerged prominently in the last 25 years – it is a system of 
adjudication that has garnered significant scholarly and critical attention. With close to 900 
ITAs registered to date (through 1 August 2017), as well as an unknown number of instances 
in which the threat of treaty arbitration has been used as a bargaining tool, states hosting foreign 
investors are increasingly finding themselves having to defend their laws and policies before 
and in the shadow of investment treaty tribunals.  
Many of these ITAs have resulted in sizable compensation awards for actions that states 
believe are both legitimate and within their exclusive purview as sovereigns;3 and it is this 
increasing resort to ITA by aggrieved foreign investors that has led many (including some 
                                                      
1 Plurilateral treaties include, inter alia: the Energy Charter Treaty; the North American Free Trade Agreement; 
the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement; the Trans-Pacific Partnership; the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference Agreement for the Promotion, Protection, and Guarantee of Investments; 
and the Association of South-East Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement. 
2 B. Simmons, "Bargaining over BITs, arbitrating awards: the regime for protection and promotion of international 
investment" World Politics, 66, no. 1 (2014), 42. 
3 D. Behn, “Legitimacy, evolution and growth in investment treaty arbitration: empirically evaluating the state-of-
the-art” Georgetown Journal of International Law, 46, no. 2 (2015), 363. 
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states) in recent years to reassess the utility of such a system of adjudication.4 At the same time, 
ITA continues on a growth trajectory, and while mere use does not connote good performance, 
its practice to date indicates a successful form of dispute settlement by most measures. 
However, is it possible that ITA is performing too well? 
As with any international legal order, the modern IIA regime might serve multiple 
purposes; but it appears that one purpose stands out as the primary driver for the development 
and maintenance of the regime as it is currently practiced: providing effective legal remedies to 
foreign investors in the event a dispute arises in the state hosting their investments (all other 
purposes are ancillary). From that perspective, ITA appears to be performing this function. This 
purpose (providing for investment treaty arbitration) is a response to a long-standing historical 
problem facing foreign investors investing abroad; and this form of adjudication – while 
arguably flawed – could be seen as providing an alternative, more effective, rule of law 
promoting, and peaceful form of dispute settlement when compared to previous modes 
established to solve the problems relating to disputes that arise in the context of foreign 
investment.  
Arguments in support of ITA hold that while this form of adjudication has issues worthy 
of reform, 5 efforts to dismantle the regime would only do away with treaty-based arbitration, 
not the underlying disputes (in fact, it might even increase the number of disputes). Therefore, 
the question is whether alternatives to ITA would not backtrack global governance in this area 
to a position prior to the advent of investment treaty arbitration: an era that was considered so 
problematic for foreign investment protection that ITA was developed as a response. However, 
given ITA’s exclusive purpose, the strongest argument against its practice is whether it is 
needed at all anymore: ie, was the development of this form of adjudication a response to a 
particular historical problem (inadequate local remedies in weak rule of law states) that is no 
longer present?  
This contribution aims to evaluate the performance of this form of international 
adjudication in light of this singular purpose thesis. In doing so, this chapter will look at how 
ITA is performing in terms of its access, outcome, and process performance in individual cases 
and its performance in the aggregate as a (global) system of adjudication. 
 
The purpose of investment treaty arbitration in historical context 
Before attempting to evaluate the performance of ITA, it is important to assess how the 
international regime on foreign investment has developed across time, what goals it has tried to 
achieve and what types of problems it has sought (explicitly or implicitly) to overcome.  
Investment treaty arbitration is a recent phenomenon. While the practice of ITA has 
emerged as a prominent form of international adjudication in the past 25 years, it is only in the 
past 50 years that ITA has even been possible. The first modern IIA was signed in 1959,6 but 
the first IIA that included ISDS provisions was not signed until 1967.7 Prior to this, there was 
                                                      
4 M. Langford, D. Behn, and O. K. Fauchald, “Backlash and state strategies in international investment law” in T. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen and T. Aalberts (eds.), The changing practices of international law: sovereignty, law and 
politics in a globalizing world (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
5 One particularly strong reform measure currently being floated is for the establishment of an international 
investment court. The purpose of establishing such a court would be to alleviate concerns, not with the utility of 
having international dispute settlement for foreign investors, but with charges that the structure of arbitration is ill-
suited for the resolution of these kinds of disputes. However, it is important to note that the current proposals for 
an international investment court do not propose a ‘court,’ but a more institutionalized form of arbitration that 
includes an appellate review mechanism. 
6 Pakistan-Germany BIT (1959). 
7 Chad-Italy BIT (1967) (never entered into force). The first BIT with ISDS to enter into force was the Netherlands-
Indonesia BIT (1969). 
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no mechanism for ITA as it is currently practiced. While there have long been examples of 
dispute settlement provisions being embedded in various types of treaties signed by states, the 
specific type of adjudication permitted in modern IIAs is new.8  
Most IIAs present a foreign investor with a standing offer to arbitrate a dispute directly 
with a state hosting their investment should a treaty breach occur, thus bypassing previous 
requirements of diplomatic espousal under international law. Further, these arbitrations will be 
composed on an ad hoc basis with relative autonomy from other disputes arising out of other 
IIAs. Combined, these structural characteristics of ITA make it a system of adjudication that is 
unfamiliar in the history of international law. 
In the following sub-sections, the purpose of this system of adjudication will be 
examined as a means of putting its recent practice in historical context. While the overall 
practice of ITA is relatively new (from about 1990), the underlying issues concerning the 
treatment of foreign aliens in the international system are long-standing and can help in 
understanding why IIAs emerged in the post-war period. The historical development of modern 
IIAs can be seen as a partial response to two sets of problems grouped broadly into the following 
categories: (1) providing alternatives to diplomatic espousal and ‘gunboat diplomacy;’ and (2) 
providing solutions to problems arising out of commercial contracts with states.  
Alternatives to diplomatic espousal 
Historically speaking, the modern IIA regime grew out of the broader category of public 
international law relating to the treatment of foreign aliens. Typically, an alien residing in a 
foreign sovereign territory will be subject primarily to the laws and customs of the state in 
which she is residing. However, international legal rules developed so as to protect foreign 
aliens from domestic rules and procedures that fall below an international minimum standard 
of treatment.9 The default rule is that the foreign alien is subject to the law of the state where 
she is residing unless the application of such laws fall below a minimum standard. However, 
even if the foreign alien has been treated in a manner below the minimum standard, how does 
she gain recourse to the law if individuals or companies are not directly subject to international 
law?  
Until very recently, the customary international law on diplomatic protection has 
provided a good answer for this question. Diplomatic protection permits the home state of a 
foreign alien to espouse a claim against the state where the foreign alien was injured. In the past 
two hundred years, diplomatic protection claims have been espoused three ways: (1) directly 
between the governments of the home state of the foreign alien and the state where the injury 
occurred; (2) as legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ);10 or (3) 
through the establishment of international claims commissions.11 However, in the post-Second 
World War period, the traditional use of diplomatic protection or espousal for remedying 
injuries to foreign aliens (particularly the narrower category of foreign investors) has largely 
been replaced by the ISDS provisions in IIAs. Since the first modern IIA was signed, there have 
                                                      
8 J. Paulsson, “Arbitration without privity” ICSID Review, 10, no. 2 (1995), 232. 
9 E. Root, “The basis of protection to citizens residing abroad” American Journal of International Law, 4, no. 3, 
(1910), 517; E. Borchard, “The minimum standard of treatment of aliens” Michigan Law Review, 38, no. 4 (1940), 
445.  
10 Also including its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). 
11 “The Jay Treaty arbitrations marked the beginning of a long line of development, which reached its high noon 
around the year 1900 and continued until well after World War I. During this period, ad hoc inter-state arbitration 
became the dominant method of resolving international claims. In a comprehensive survey, A. M. Sruyt has 
catalogued around 380 international arbitrations that were conducted during the period 1776-1925.” V. Heiskanen, 
“Arbitrating mass investor claims: lessons of international claims commissions” in B. Macmahon (ed.), Multiple 
party actions in international arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2009), 299. 
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only been three foreign investment related cases involving diplomatic espousal brought before 
the ICJ.12  
The ISDS provisions in IIAs represent a significant shift away from the traditional 
model of diplomatic espousal and can be seen as one of the underlying structural objectives or 
goals of IIAs: states choosing to allow direct rights of action to foreign investors for breaches 
to the underlying IIA. The exact reasons as to why states have chosen this option is not entirely 
clear historically, but is often attributed to the perceived benefits of ‘de-politicizing’ 
international disputes and the political and economic efficiencies that can be gained when an 
international dispute involving a foreign alien can be directly resolved with the state where the 
injury occurred without directly involving the foreign alien’s home state.  
In the past, disputes requiring diplomatic espousal of foreign alien claims have – at times 
– escalated into what has been called ‘gunboat diplomacy,’ whereby the home state of the 
foreign alien threatens or uses force against the state where the foreign alien was injured.13 
Many of these examples of gunboat diplomacy occurred in states that had already declared 
independence in the nineteenth century (ie, Latin American states); and without sufficient 
international legal remedies (none had been sufficiently developed prior to the First World 
War), imperial powers frequently used their military prowess to intimidate or pressure certain 
states into providing remedies for injured foreign aliens. The post-Second World War 
international legal developments that provides an alternative to gunboat diplomacy (ie, ITA) 
has been seen by some states as a beneficial alternative.  
In historical terms then, one of the performance criteria that could be used to evaluate 
ITA is whether the move away from diplomatic espousal for these types of international 
disputes has actually improved relations between states and the extent to which the robustness 
of legal dispute resolution for conflicts between foreigners and the states in which they invest 
has reduced the real or potential risk of gunboat diplomacy. 
Alternatives to commercial arbitration with states 
One additional goal of the modern IIA regime can be identified by looking at the history of 
colonialism and the contractual arrangements between foreign investors and states that emerged 
in the period before and after decolonization. There is an argument that the emergence of IIAs 
can be largely attributed to the geopolitics associated with the process of decolonization and 
the perceived lack of legal protections for foreign investors in newly independent states.14 
During the colonial era, imperial states were able to protect the investments of their citizens by 
extending their sovereign control over colonial territories. Foreign investment in the colonies 
was not really foreign at all (at least not foreign capital initiating in the imperial state of that 
colony). There was little need for international legal protections that were distinct from the legal 
protections already available to foreign aliens (ie, citizens of the imperial state) operating within 
the territory of the colony.  
However, as states began to decolonize in the post-Second World War period, some 
foreign investors were placed in a vulnerable position: many newly independent states sought 
                                                      
12 These include: Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Reports 3; ELSI (US v. Italy) 1989 I.C.J. 
Reports 15; and Diallo (Guinea v. DRC) 2012 I.C.J. Reports 324. 
13 Great Britain intervened militarily in Latin American states on at least 40 occasions between 1820 and 1914. 
14 However, considering that most early BITs did not include ISDS provisions, it is more likely that early IIA 
practice was little more than a signaling of friendly relations between developing and developed economies, with 
little expectation from developing states that they would become subject to investment treaty disputes. There is a 
good argument that some of these early IIAs were intended to develop relationships between former colonial 
powers and potential markets that had been closed to them previously (ie, the colonies of other colonial powers). 
Of the 403 IIAs signed before 1990, over half (207) were signed between a colonial power and a former colony. 
However, only 16 IIAs were signed by a colonial power and their former colony. 
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to denounce historical oppression from the colonial powers by declaring that foreigners residing 
or investing within the sovereign territory of these newly formed states would not be afforded 
any special rights independent of the rights granted to nationals.  
At the international level, this policy was initially pursued at the United Nations (UN) 
through declarations on permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR)15 in what later 
came to be described as the new international economic order (NIEO).16 These declarations 
asserted, inter alia, that sovereign states had the autonomy to shape their own policies on how 
foreign investors would be treated within their territory. Many of the former colonies were (are) 
rich in resources, and they believed that – as newly independent states – those resources were 
exclusively theirs to exploit and the nationalization of natural resource operations was legal and 
did not require compensation commensurate with the customary international law standard. 
During this period, many newly independent states pursued nationalization policies 
(especially in the extractive industries). The practice of nationalization signaled two problems 
for foreign investment protection. The first problem was that some foreign investors found that 
the nationalization of their assets might not be compensated at the level required by customary 
international law. The second problem was that even if their contracts or concessions with states 
included strong dispute settlement mechanisms calling for international arbitration, enforcing a 
favorable award against a state was not always a straightforward process. Many arbitrations 
that did result from nationalizations in the 1950s through the 1970s demonstrated that there 
would be considerable difficulty at the enforcement stage of the proceedings. 
So, while some newly independent states made broad declarations on the international 
stage through the PSNR and NIEO declarations, nationalized their natural resource operations, 
and signaled that contract-based arbitration might not be a viable means to protect foreign 
investments, many of these same states also knew that they would not be able to develop their 
economies without foreign capital and expertise. The main question to arise in this context was 
how these states could convince foreign investors that their investments would be adequately 
protected. For some investors and states, the continued practice of signing contracts and 
concessions with arbitration clauses would be sufficient. However, for others, more robust 
solutions would have to develop; and two did: (1) the signing of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention; and (2) the signing of BITs between 
capital-exporting and capital-importing states.    
As to the first solution, the ICSID Convention was ratified in 1965. The ICSID 
Convention does two things of critical significance: (1) it allows for contracts to be 
‘internationalized,’ thus overcoming the perceived problem during the NIEO that contracts 
would be subject to national expropriation laws (and their significantly lower rates of 
compensation); and (2) it requires that final arbitral awards be directly enforceable against states 
without the requirement of further enforcement procedures in domestic courts. It was thought 
that the inclusion of an ICSID arbitration clause in a contract with a state could remedy both of 
these issues. 
The second solution was for some capital-exporting states to sign BITs with capital-
importing states. While it remains unclear whether these early BITs were only pursued as a 
response to the problems of foreign asset protection that emerged after decolonization, some 
have argued that these agreements emerged as a means of defecting from the broader policy 
                                                      
15 Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources, UNGA Resolution 626 (21 December 1952); Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, UNGA Resolution 1803 (14 December 1962); Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources, UNGA Resolution 3171 (17 December 1973).  




objectives pursued at the international level through the PSNR and NIEO declarations. 17 
Regardless of exact reasons, IIAs became increasingly popular between the 1960s and the 1980s 
and would explode in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the 
so-called ‘Washington consensus.’ By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
over 3,000 of these agreements had been signed (see figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1 IIAs signed by year (1980-2017) 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD IIA database <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA> accessed 1 August 2017 
These agreements form the jurisdictional basis of investment treaty arbitral tribunals, and 
while the contemporary practice of these tribunals has exposed some serious problems, they 
can also be seen as alternatives to many of the previous attempts to protect foreign investments 
that have just been highlighted. Even if this historical narrative is incomplete, there is a case to 
be made that ITA – at a minimum – can be viewed as an alternative to other forms of dispute 
settlement (ie, national courts, international commercial arbitration, and diplomatic espousal) 
and as a peaceful alternative to various historical incarnations of gunboat diplomacy or neo-
colonial occupation. 
Assessing the performance of investment treaty arbitration  
In the following three-sub-sections, the performance of ITA will be considered given the 
historical narrative discussed in the previous section. Investment treaty arbitration differs 
significantly in both structure and function to many of the other judicial institutions presented 
in this volume. To that end, assessing the performance of ITA might present particular 
challenges that are taken for granted in the context of standing international courts. ITA remains 
a largely decentralized institution for three key reasons; and it is this structure that may make a 
holistic evaluation of its access, outcome, and process performance difficult to ascertain. 
First, the jurisdiction of an investment treaty arbitral tribunal is based on a patchwork 
of thousands of mostly bilateral IIAs. While many of these IIAs share similar substantive 
provisions, there remains significant diversity among the agreements; and it is this diversity 
that can often explain differences in outcomes and the procedural and substantive application 
of the relevant law across tribunals. In terms of assessing ITA’s contribution to the stabilization 
of international legal expectations and in the efficient and consistent resolution of disputes, the 
                                                      
17 A. Guzman, “Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: explaining the popularity of bilateral investment treaties” 
Virginia Journal of International Law, 38 (1997), 639. 
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practice to date appears to be somewhat mixed: there does seem to be a jurisprudence constante 
emerging among some legal rules, but others remain subject to varying interpretations and 
outcomes.  
A full assessment of how ITA tribunals have assisted in the development of international 
law is beyond the scope of this contribution, but there are a few examples that may provide 
some insight. Overall, the development of almost all of the lex specialis substantive standards 
in IIAs has been significantly clarified through the practice of ITA.18 Of particular note are 
claims about the shifts in the sensitivity that investment treaty arbitral tribunals have towards 
the balancing of interests; between the needs of the respondent state to regulate in the public 
interest (ie, in the interest of the environment and human rights) and the needs of foreign 
investors to be provided with a legally stable investment climate. Recent studies show that 
arbitrators in ITAs are becoming significantly more nuanced in approaching environmental 
issues in the context of foreign investment protection.19 However, while the practice of ITA is 
definitely assisting in the clarification of the legal standards in IIAs, it is having much less of 
an impact on general international law and customary international law (with the possible 
exception of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment and the level of 
compensation required in cases of expropriation). There is very little evidence of other 
international courts and tribunals citing to ITA awards. 
A partial explanation for this limited influence on other areas of international law is 
likely the result of what can be considered the second distinct attribute of ITA vis-a-vis other 
international judicial institutions: the ad hoc, one-off constitution of tribunals for particular 
disputes.20 While it is increasingly apparent that recent ITA tribunals are constituted with a core 
group of prominent and repeatedly appointed arbitrators21 that apply the law in a relatively 
coherent manner,22 the structure of ITA as an ad hoc institution based on party-appointed 
arbitrators means that the precedential value of individual cases may be lacking.  
A third reason as to why ITA differs structurally from many other international courts 
is that tribunals can be constituted under a wide array of arbitral institutions (or no institution 
at all, as in the case of ad hoc tribunals constituted under the United Nations Conference on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules). Each of these institutions provides its 
own set of procedural rules and institutional support structure for disputes. The most significant 
caseload for ITA remains at ICSID, but other commercial arbitration centers such as the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) all have treaty-based arbitrations on their 
dockets. Further, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), who handled very few cases in the 
later part of the twentieth century has had a significant rebirth and now lists a caseload of 76 
                                                      
18 See eg R. Dolzer, “Fair and equitable treatment: today’s contours” Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 
12, no. 1 (2014), 7; J. Maupin, “MFN-based jurisdiction in investor-state arbitration: is there any hope for a 
consistent approach” Journal of International Economic Law, 14, no. 1 (2011), 157; S. Alexandrov, “The evolution 
of the full protection and security standard” in Meg Kinnear et al (eds.), Building international investment law: 
the first 50 years of ICSID (Kluwer, 2015), 319; C. Henckels, “Indirect expropriation and the right to regulate: 
revisiting proportionality analysis and the standard of review in investor-state arbitration” Journal of International 
Economic Law, 15, no. 1 (2012), 223. 
19  D. Behn and M. Langford, “Trumping the environment? An empirical perspective on the legitimacy of 
investment treaty arbitration” Journal of World Investment and Trade, 18 (2017); J. Viñuales, “foreign investment 
and the environment in international law: the current state of play” in K. Miles (ed.), Research handbook on 
environment and investment law (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
20 A. Björklund, “Private rights and public international law: why competition among international economic law 
tribunals is not working” Hastings Law Journal, 59 (2007), 241. 
21 S. Puig, “Social capital in the arbitration market” European Journal of International Law, 25, no. 2 (2014), 387.    
22  O. K. Fauchald, “The legal reasoning of ICSID tribunals: an empirical analysis” European Journal of 
International Law, 19, no. 2 (2008), 301. 
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pending ITAs as of 1 August 2017. The differences among tribunals as constituted across these 
various institutions can be significant. 
These three reasons provide a basis for justifying ITA as a potentially discrete form of 
international adjudication when compared to other international judicial institutions. However, 
there are also reasons to believe that ITA is capable of assessment as a collective system of 
legal adjudication. Given ITA’s decentralized structure, it may be somewhat surprising to note 
that there is relatively high level of organic, informal coordination among tribunals and 
institutions that has resulted considerable coherence in their practice. As such, it is not 
uncommon to see the universe of IIAs and the disputes that arise under them to be referred to 
as the ‘international investment regime.’23 
Whether there is really such a coherent regime remains open to debate, but for the 
purposes of this contribution it may be helpful to view ITA as part of an international regime 
whose performance can be analyzed and evaluated as collective system of law that shares 
common purposes and functions. With hundreds of treaty-based arbitrations that have been 
lodged to date, there is a significant caseload that can provide a sound basis for systematic 
evaluation of the performance of investment treaty arbitration overall.   
Figure 3.2 ITAs initiated by year (1987-2017) 
 
Source: PluriCourts Investment Treaty and Arbitration Database (PITAD) through 1 August 2017 
There are 878 known ITA cases that have been registered as of 1 August 2017: 298 of 
which remain pending.24 The majority of the cases (523 or 59%) have been initiated according 
to the ICSID Convention. The remaining two-fifths (355 or 41%) are primarily ad hoc cases 
based on the UNCITRAL arbitration rules (many of which are being administered by the PCA; 
and to a lesser degree, cases filed at commercial arbitration centers such as the SCC, ICC, and 
LCIA. Of the 878 cases that have been filed, approximately 50 cases were filed before 2000 
and over 800 have been filed in the period of 2000 through 2017. 91% of all the cases ever filed 
have come in the past 15 years; 71% have been filed in the last 10 years; and 42% of all cases 
have come in just the past five years (see figure 3.2). By any measure, this is a remarkable 
growth trajectory.  
                                                      
23 J. Salacuse, “The emerging global regime for investment” Harvard International Law Journal, 51, no. 2 (2010), 
427. 
24 There are likely to be a small percentage that remain undiscovered, but would estimate this number in decline 
as ITA cases are increasingly difficult to keep out of the public domain in their entirety. Estimates are that about 




While the current caseload of ITA appears quite significant when compared to some other 
international judicial institutions such as the ICJ or the World Trade Organization (WTO), it 
appears less impressive when compared with the caseload of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) or international commercial arbitrations initiated by, for example, the ICC’s 
International Court of Arbitration; and in fact, the number of treaty-based arbitrations filed to 
date might be just a small fraction of potential claims. Furthermore, one of the biggest issues in 
regard to performance at the individual case level relates to access to ITA rather than its 
processes or outcomes. As a largely bilateral treaty regime, the coverage of treaties allowing 
for ITA is limited to those states that have agreed to such bilateral relationships. If an assessment 
of the performance of ITA refers to the number of cases that have arisen to date, an equally 
relevant assessment is the number of cases that have not arisen because of issues relating to 
access to this form of adjudication. Two points on this issue of access are illustrative. 
First, one must put the number of IIAs into perspective. While 3,327 IIAs have been 
signed (through 1 August 2017), 3,171 of which are current,25 significantly fewer agreements 
have been ratified and are in force: a total of 2,673. 26 Furthermore, if one were to take the 
number of bilateral relationships represented by the WTO agreements with its current 
membership of 162 states, there would have to be 13,04127 BITs to reach the same amount of 
coverage. Without taking into consideration the vast differences between foreign investment 
flows between states and the fact that some plurilateral investment agreements provide much 
more coverage than a single BIT,28 the number of IIAs currently in force covers approximately 
20% of bilateral state relationships in comparison with the WTO agreements. This means that 
the number of cases that have been initiated to date have done so as based on very limited 
geographical scope. A multilateral arrangement for the protection of foreign investment would 
dramatically increase the potential claims that could be filed.   
Figure 3.3 Most frequently invoked IIAs in ITA 
 
Source: PITAD through 1 August 2017 
                                                      
25 156 of signed IIAs have been terminated. 
26 654 IIAs that have been signed but are not force. 
27 (162*161)/2 
28 For example, the recently signed – but not yet ratified (and may never be ratified following the US withdrawal 




A second point relating to access is the modest number of IIAs that have been used in 
all of the disputes that have been initiated to date. While there are 2,673 IIAs in force around 
the world, the 878 disputes to date have applied a mere 375 IIAs. While the current number of 
IIAs in the world only covers approximately 20% of potential bilateral pairings (at least in terms 
of gaining the same coverage as the WTO), only 14% of IIAs in force have been used in actual 
ITA cases. For critics of the use of ITA, this type of limited access may be a positive restriction. 
But if one is to assess this in terms of performance, one could easily argue that the current 
structure of investment treaty arbitration is so restrictive and selective that it leaves vast swaths 
of foreign investors without treaty protections and also disproportionately targets specific states 
that have been repeat respondent states in investment treaty arbitrations under the same treaty. 
For example, figure 3.3 shows the most frequently invoked treaties in ITA.29 Remarkably, just 
six IIAs have been used in 25% (219 cases) of all ITAs registered to date.  
The limited number of IIAs that have been used in ITA – and the high instances of a 
small number of treaties being invoked multiple times – demonstrates the uneven coverage and 
the uneven use of these agreements. In addition to issue of access, the pattern of use also raises 
a number of performance-related questions. Are certain respondent states being targeted? Are 
IIAs used reciprocally? And if not, what types of states are frequently sued in investment treaty 
arbitration? 
On the issue of targeting, one can deduce from the data that the use of ITA tends to 
cluster around a small number of states. While there have been 111 different states as 
respondents in ITA cases, only 30 of those states have been sued once. The remaining 81 states 
have all received more than one claim. 15 states have between five and nine claims against them 
and 23 states have 10 or more.  
As figure 3.4 demonstrates, the top six respondent states in ITA constitute 26% of all 
claims initiated to date (225 cases). While some of the clustering of states can be explained by 
particular events (Argentina) or policy choices (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Spain), others are less 
obvious as to why they have attracted so many claims (Egypt, Czech Republic, and Poland).  
Figure 3.4 Most frequent respondent states in ITA 
 
Source: PITAD through 1 August 2017 




While it is possible that the fact that Egypt, Czech Republic, and Poland have attracted 
a high number of ITA claims is explained by significant number of IIAs that these states have 
ratified, there are a number of other states with high numbers of IIAs that have received 
relatively few (or no) disputes (eg, Turkey, China, Belarus, Iran, Malaysia, and Vietnam). 
Looking at those states that have been sued most frequently, there is one final consideration: 
particular treaties or types of treaties. Cases arising under the NAFTA explain nearly all of the 
cases against Canada (25 out of 26 cases), the US (18 out of 18 cases), and Mexico (19 out of 
26 cases). Further, in the case of Poland, Spain, and the Czech Republic, 87 out of 107 of the 
cases that have been filed against these states arise under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) or 
an intra-European Union (EU) BIT.  
While all IIAs, especially BITs, are designed to be reciprocal, in operation they are used 
primarily uni-directionally. For example, of the 878 registered cases, there is only one treaty 
that has been invoked reciprocally.30 Further, ITA disputes tend to be brought by investors from 
a capital-exporting state against a capital-importing state; this pattern correlates with the 
development status of states. In other words, the vast majority of ITAs brought to date have 
been initiated by claimant-investors from states with a higher development status than the 
respondent state. For example, table 1 below shows that 87% of the 878 cases initiated have 
been brought by claimant-investors from a high income state (as measured by the World Bank 
income categories). Further, there are only 26 cases where the development status of the home 
state of the claimant-investor is lower than the development status of the respondent host state.  
On the respondent side of the dispute, the development status of states is distributed 
more evenly, with the highest percentage of respondent states falling in the upper middle 
income group. Interestingly, there are very few cases brought against low income states. While 
this challenges many perceptions that ITA is used by powerful economic actors from the 
developed world against poorer developing states, the reality is more nuanced. Very poor states 
tend to be excluded from many forms of international economic governance and investment 
treaty arbitration is no exception. There is no evidence of targeting against low income states, 
primarily because foreign investment flowing into these states is very low in the first place. 
However, there is an issue of targeting in ITA, but to date the targeting has been against more 
developed states (see figure 3.4). The exceptions in this regard are Egypt and Ecuador. 
Table 3.1 Registered ITA cases by host and home state World Bank income groups 
  Claimant-investor home state  



















 High income 
229 21 5 0 255 
25.9 % 2.4 % 1.0 % 0.0 % 28.9% 
Upper middle income 336 43 0 0 385 38.3 % 4.9 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 43.8% 
Lower middle income 174 40 2 0 216 19.8 % 4.5 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 24.7% 
Low income 21 2 0 0 23 2.4 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 2.7% 
             Sum (878 cases) 760 106 12 0 878 86.5 % 12.1 % 1.4 % 0.0 % 100.0% 
 
Source: PITAD through 1 August 2017 
                                                      
30 Spain-Argentina BIT (1992). 
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Overall, one can say that ITA has been used by claimant-investors in well developed 
economies against respondents from slightly less developed – but not low income – states. In 
many ways, this makes sense. The signing of IIAs over the past 60 years reflects this pattern. If 
the purpose of IIAs was to provide legal protections for foreign investors in capital-exporting 
states who are investing in capital-importing states, the performance of ITA to date supports 
this pattern. It is an entirely different question, however, as to whether this should be the way 
that ITA is performing.  
Even when claimant-investors have access to ITA they tend to use it sparingly; and the 
majority of cases that have been brought to date appear to be claims of last resort. For example, 
the global number of registered multinationals and their subsidiaries in 2007 stood at least 
858,000.31 This means that the 878 cases to date may be a mere fraction of potential claims. 
This fact may foster additional instability for the regime as ITA becomes more popular and 
well-known as a means for adjudicating international disputes. There is a potential for 
thousands of cases entering the pipeline in the coming decades. Take a further example on the 
limited number of cases filed to date: there are currently 38 investment treaty arbitrations (all 
based on the ECT) that have been filed against Spain (three have been concluded) in relation to 
the incentivization of renewable energy. However, one source claims that there have been over 
650,000 domestic court cases that have been filed in relation to the same issues being litigated 
in the treaty-based arbitrations.32 
Figure 3.5 Most frequent investor home states in ITA 
 
 
Source: PITAD through 1 August 2017 
Further, while there are a number of home states of claimant-investors that use ITA 
frequently (see figure 3.5), there are very few examples of repeat claimant-investors. The top 
six home states of claimant-investors accounts for 54% of all cases initiated to date (468 cases). 
On the issue of repeat claimant-investors, 771 cases (out of 878) were brought by a foreign 
investor that had never brought an ITA case before. Of the remaining 107 cases, there are a 
number of examples of entities using ITA more than once; and a few examples of entities using 
ITA repeatedly against the same state (eg, Yukos shareholders – Russia, Uzan family claims – 
Turkey, and Bogdanov family claims – Moldova) and against multiple states (eg, SGS, 
                                                      
31 UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2007). 
32 D. Behn and O. K. Fauchald, “Governments under cross-fire: renewable energy and international economic 
tribunals” Manchester Journal of International Economic Law, 12, no. 2 (2015), 117. 
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Impregilo, Phillip Morris, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, EDF, Vivendi, France Telecom, AES, 
and RSM). 
The conclusion that these illustrations capture is that ITA as it is currently practiced 
represents a small fraction of potential cases and the limitations in treaty coverage have resulted 
in a small number of states having to respond to a disproportionately high number of cases (and 
repeatedly in many instances). In terms of performance deficits, the clearest issue for ITA 
relates to the fact that many foreign investors do not have access to ITA and those that do have 
access appear to bring suits disproportionately against a small number of targeted states.  
Outcome performance 
Moving from patterns of use to patterns of outcomes, this section will assess the performance 
of ITA in relation to outcomes in specific cases. Given the number of cases that have been filed 
to date, how has ITA performed in terms of its ability to resolve particular disputes? Further, 
what performance deficits can be identified, and are they able to be improved?  
While ITA has been on a growth trajectory, the early days of ITA were fairly modest. 
There was a 30-year gap between the signing of the first BIT and the first treaty-based 
arbitration. The first treaty-based investment dispute was initiated in the late-1980s and 
rendered an award in 1990.33 Before this date, there were a number of ICSID arbitrations but 
they were all based on ICSID arbitration clauses in investment contracts with states or in a host 
state’s foreign investment law that included recourse to ICSID arbitration in the event of a 
dispute. While there continues to be some practice of foreign investment law-based or contract-
based ICISD arbitrations, they are now in the distinct minority when compared to treaty-based 
arbitrations.  
Through the 1990s, there were only a handful of ITA cases that were initiated and an 
even smaller number that reached final awards. Almost all of these cases were arbitrations 
administered according to the ICSID Convention. However, there were a few ad hoc tribunals 
established under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules during this decade as well. The first known 
UNCITRAL treaty-based arbitration issued an award in 1995.34 Towards the end of the 1990s, 
a number of cases based on NAFTA were also initiated. Most of these early cases were brought 
by US investors against Mexico, but there were also a few important cases brought by Canadian 
investors against the US, and by US investors against Canada. 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, there were approximately 43 ITA that had been 
initiated, and after 2000 the annual number of initiated claims starts to increase substantially. 
The 2000s saw an additional 334 cases registered; and the period of 2010 through the present 
added 501. Overall, of the 878 registered ITA cases, 388 cases have reached final awards, 124 
cases have settled, 67 cases were discontinued, and 299 cases remain pending. From this 
dataset, we see that the cases resolved through final decisions in the first instance (ie, not 
including annulments at ICSID or set-aside proceedings in domestic courts) found in favor of 
the claimant-investor in 175 instances and found in favor of the respondent state in 213 
instances (see figure 3.6).  
Including just these cases that were resolved in the form of final awards in the first 
instance, the win-loss rate does not appear problematic on its face. Claimant-investors win 45% 
of the time. However, we can assume a significant number of settled were resolved in favor of 
the claimant-investor, even if the investor did not secure its preferred or ideal remedy in these 
cases. Taking the settled cases as representing (at least partial) win for the claimant-investor, 
the win rates rise from 45% to approximately 67%.  
                                                      
33 Asian Agricultural Products Limited (AAPL) v Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3). 
34 Saar Papier v. Poland (UNCITRAL) 1994. 
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Figure 3.6 Finally resolved ITA cases (1990-2017) 
 
Source: PITAD through August 1 2017 
Before briefly turning to some of the critiques relating to outcomes and structural bias 
in the ITA regime, it is interesting to divide up the cases between jurisdictional decisions and 
merits decisions. In doing so, we see that tribunals in an ITA case accept jurisdiction in 72% of 
disputes (278 out of 388 cases ending in a final award). 
There are a number of reasons why tribunals accept jurisdiction in the vast number of 
claims brought before them: some are probably completely benign, others may be less so. In 
many ways, the nature of investment treaty arbitration means that cases of this type are often 
brought as last resort, and given the seriousness of a private entity bringing suit against a foreign 
state (the ‘seriousness’ thesis), a high number of cases of questionable jurisdiction are not 
entering into the system in the first place. However, an alternative argument – of the less benign 
type – is that tribunals have been systematically expanding their jurisdiction in ITAs across 
time (in order to benefit from more cases and more arbitral appointments) by defining key terms 
such as what constitutes an eligible ‘foreign investor’ and ‘foreign investment’ in a liberal 
manner (the ‘expansiveness’ thesis).  
A study, using content analysis to assess the jurisdictional aspects of early ITAs, 
supports the expansiveness thesis.35 However, figure 3.7 shows that the expansiveness thesis 
does not hold across time. Tribunals before 2005 accepted jurisdiction on average in about 
85%% of the cases, while case brought in the last 10 years drop to about 70%. The conclusions 
that can be drawn from these numbers is that there may have been some early expansiveness in 
interpretations on jurisdictional issues, but that the more recent trend is that tribunals may either 
be restricting their jurisdictional interpretations (the opposite of the ‘expansiveness’ thesis) or 
that there are more dubious cases entering the system (the opposite of the ‘seriousness’ thesis). 
  In addition to the issues of jurisdiction, one of the fundamental critiques against ITA 
outcomes is that there is a pro-investor bias, reflected in in claimant-investors winning a high 
percentage of claims. While there appears to be a near 45% to 55% split in favor of respondent 
states overall (see figure 3.6), the chances of a claimant-investor winning at the merits stage of 
the dispute (ie, after jurisdiction has been accepted) shifts back in favor of the claimant-investor. 
Out of 288 cases where an ITA tribunal accepts jurisdiction and decides on the merits of the 
                                                      
35 G. Van Harten, “Arbitrator behavior in asymmetrical adjudication: an empirical study of investment treaty 
arbitration” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 50, no. 1 (2012), 211. 
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dispute, claimant-investors have succeeded in 161 out of 288 cases (55% success rate). While 
the success rates at the merits stage of the dispute do surpass the 50% mark, it is not readily 
apparent (in terms of raw numbers) of a systemic pro-investor bias in ITA. However, if one is 
to assess the success rates in ITA compared with those at the ECtHR or with domestic 
administrative review courts, the success rate for claimant-investors may indeed be 
disproportionately high.  
Figure 3.7 Jurisdictional decisions in finally resolved cases (across time) 
 
Source: PITAD through 1 August 2017 
While the pro-investor bias claims are still made (mostly by non-experts), the perception 
that there is an anti-developing state bias is gaining more traction in scholarly literature of late. 
Prior to the mid-2000s, there were not a sufficient number of ITAs to warrant systematic 
empirical analysis of the types of states being sued, the type of claimants bringing suit, and the 
outcomes of these cases. However, from the mid-2000s onwards, a number of critiques emerged 
in the context of investment treaty disputes. In response, earlier studies indicated that there was 
not a statistically significant relationship between outcomes and the development status of the 
respondent state.36 One of the key caveats with these studies is that there were not many cases 
against developed states in the early jurisprudence.  
More recent studies bring some of these early results into question.37 As more cases 
enter the system and as more developed (and emerging economy) states are sued, the universe 
of ITAs that have reached a final award (388) has significantly expanded. This is a large 
increase over the approximately 140 cases included in earlier studies. Using a dataset of all 
cases reaching a final award in the first instance, a recent study shows that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the state being 
sued and its likelihood to lose a case.38 This correlation indicates that the poorer the state is the 
more likely it is to lose an ITA. This is troubling in regard to issues relating to the legitimacy 
of ITA but also raise questions about its performance. If a system of adjudication produces a 
systemic bias against respondent states on the basis of their relative wealth, we should certainly 
be concerned. Anecdotally, it is interesting to note that the US (a high income state) has 
                                                      
36 S. Franck, “Conflating politics and development: examining investment treaty outcomes” Virginia Journal of 
International Law, 55 (2014), 55. 
37 D. Behn, T. Berge and M. Langford, “Poor states or poor governance: explaining outcomes in investment treaty 




famously never lost an ITA case, while Zimbabwe and Burundi (low income states) have never 
defeated an investor claim.39  
Before turning to issues of process performance, there are a few additional issues 
relating to outcome performance that are worthy of mention. These include issues of a lack of 
diversity in the subject-matter of cases, the exorbitant size of compensation awards, and the 
losing state’s lack of compliance with monetary awards. To test these claims and to assess them 
in regard to outcome performance, we look to see if there are any aggregate patterns in outcomes 
across these selective issues areas. 
The subject-matter of ITAs brought before 2000 were largely related (but certainly not 
exclusively) to projects in the extractive industries. However, in more recent years there has 
been a significant diversification of the types of cases.40 This can be viewed as a positive or 
negative development depending on one’s perspectives. It is positive in the sense that, as a 
general system of adjudication, ITA looks less and less like a system that is tailor-made for the 
energy and extractive industries. It might be viewed as a negative development, however, as 
more and more cases arise out of foreign investments that were not originally envisioned as the 
types of investments that should be eligible for protections under IIAs. For example, there is a 
trend towards disputes involving the financial services sector and other service industries.  
Figure 3.8 Economic sector distribution for all registered ITA cases (1990-2017) 
 
Source: PITAD through 1 August 2017 
Looking at all ITA cases registered to date (878), we see a considerable diversity of the 
types of cases that have been resolved. Figure 3.8 shows the distribution and subject-matter 
diversity for all registered. Despite this diversification, the extractive industry and energy sector 
disputes are still the two most represented economic sectors using ITA (17% for the extractive 
industries and 19% for electricity/energy cases).  And there is still the perception that claimant-
investors tend to do disproportionately well in these types of cases in terms of win percentages 
and the monetary compensation awarded. However, it is important to note, that the 
manufacturing, construction and finance sectors now each constitute a double digit percentage 
of the caseload, which is a dramatic shift if compared with the early ITA caseload where the 
percentages for these sectors were either negligible or in the low single digits. 
In terms of outcomes, there are a few interesting patterns worth noting that largely 
confirm the aforementioned perceptions.  If we look at the win-loss ratios for all finally resolved 
                                                      
39 PITAD. 
40 Behn, “Legitimacy, evolution and growth in investment treaty arbitration” 
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ITA cases in the extractive industry and electricity/energy generation sectors versus cases 
involving all other economic sectors, there are two striking differences in the outcomes. First, 
ITAs involving the extractive industries or energy sectors are much more likely to settle; and 
second, in these cases, the respondent state has a much lower chance of successfully defending 
itself against a claim (in comparison to outcomes in the other economic sectors). For extractive 
industry and electricity/ energy generation cases that have been fully resolved (182 cases), 
claimant-investors win 35% of the time, lose 31%, settle 25%, and discontinue 9%. For all other 
economic sectors (397 cases), claimant-investors win 28% of the time, lose 39%, settle 20%, 
and discontinue 13%. 
However, it is not very surprising that cases in these two sectors are more likely to settle 
and that the state is less likely to succeed in defending itself against such claims. This is because 
many of these cases concern very large projects (with massive sunk costs) that become subject 
to various types of nationalizations/expropriations where the issue in dispute is more in relation 
to the level of compensation than to whether the state is liable. In regards to performance, the 
difference in outcome patterns between these two sectors and all other economic sectors is not 
very problematic; however, ITA cases in the extractive industry and electricity/energy 
generation sectors do tend to be more visible and high profile than others, and as such, these 
cases (where states lose or settle much more often than they win) might contribute to creating 
perceptions that the ITA system is unbalanced in favor of claimant-investors.   
Turning to the amounts of compensation awarded to successful claimant-investors in 
ITAs, there are a number of patterns worth noting. The issue of compensation levels has been 
one of the more controversial areas in ITA. With a number of high-profile cases awarding 
claimant-investors in excess of one billion US dollars (USD),41 questions about the fairness and 
reasonableness of such compensation has continually entered the discourse. However, looking 
at the awards to date with the highest dollar amounts attached to them, they are all relating to 
expropriations in the extractive industries. These cases, with the exception of the three Yukos 
awards (which were found to be indirect expropriations by Russia), were all direct 
expropriations where the respondent states (Ecuador and Venezuela, respectively) likely knew 
that they would be found liable for breaches to the relevant IIA because they had not offered 
adequate compensation for the direct expropriations according to the standards of international 
law.  
While the massive monetary awards are the ones that have grabbed the headlines, the 
overall levels of compensation awarded to winning claimant-investors are considerably more 
modest in the aggregate. This does not discount the fact that some cases have awarded 
compensation awards to winning cases where the USD amount of the award is significant in 
terms of the annual GDP of a particular state (eg, a 935 million USD award against Libya or a 
266 million USD award against Lebanon), these awards remain the distinct minority in ITA. 
Of the 175 cases to date where the claimant-investor has won at the liability/merits stage of the 
proceedings, there are 10 cases where the amount of damages awarded remains pending (only 
a liability award has been rendered to date) and 10 cases where the amount awarded is unknown. 
Thus, of the 155 cases where a claimant-investor has won on the merits and the amount of 
compensation awarded is known (see figure 3.9), the distribution is highest in the 10 to 100 
                                                      
41 There are six cases where the claimant-investor was awarded in excess of one billion USD: Hulley Enterprises 
v. Russia (PCA UNCITRAL) (40 billion USD); Veteran Petroleum v. Russia (PCA UNCITRAL) 2014 (8.2 billion 
USD); Yukos Universal v. Russia (PCA UNCITRAL) 2014 (1.8 billion USD); Occidental v. Ecuador (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/11) (1.8 billion USD) 2014; Venezuela Holdings v. Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27) 2015 
(1.6 billion USD); Crystallex v. Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2) 2016 (1.4 billion USD). However, it 
is equally important to note that annulment committees have significantly reduced the amount of compensation 
awarded in Occidental and Venezuela Holdings, and the three Yukos awards have been set-aside in the courts of 
the Netherlands (pending high court review). 
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million USD range with 54 awards fitting into that category. However, there are also 63 awards 
totaling less than 10 million.  
Interestingly, of the 25 awards where the claimant-investor is awarded less than one 
million USD, there are five cases where the tribunal found a breach of the IIA but awarded no 
compensation to the claimant-investor. Taking out the six awards where over one billion USD 
was awarded and the five awards where no compensation was awarded, the average 
compensation (149 awards) amounts to approximately 72.8 million USD and the grand total 
awarded equals approximately10.2 billion USD in total across the entire universe of ITAs. 
While this number sounds substantial for sure, it may appear slightly more modest if reflecting 
the trillions and trillions of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows that have occurred global 
since the first ITA award was rendered in 1990. In other words, the amount of compensation 
awarded to claimant-investors might be found to be egregious in particular cases, but in the 
aggregate the amounts awarded to date do not appear to be particularly troubling. 
Figure 3.9 ITA compensation ranges in USD (155 cases) 
 
Source: PITAD through 1 August 2017 
The final issue to be discussed in terms of outcome performance is that of compliance 
with awards rendered against respondent states in ITA. As discussed in the first section of this 
chapter, the difficulty in compelling a state to satisfy an international arbitral award against it 
is a long-standing problem. While the New York Convention has been in place for over 60 
years and has been very effective in enforcing and recognizing international commercial 
arbitration awards, its effectiveness in enforcing treaty-based arbitration awards has been a bit 
more mixed due to the complexities associated with issues of sovereignty when the award is 
being enforced against a state. The ICSID Convention sought to overcome the problems 
associated with enforcing an award against a state: Article 53 of the ICSID Convention bypasses 
the need for national court recognition under the New York Convention. For the early ICSID 
cases, this innovation seemed to be working as many early awards were paid without significant 
challenge. The direct enforceability of awards under the ICSID Convention was systemically 
challenged for the first time following Argentina’s financial collapse in 2001. 
Argentina has been steadfast in refusing to enforce ICSID awards, arguing that despite 
reference to the direct enforceability of awards in the ICSID Convention, the Argentinian 
constitution requires all payments out of the state treasury to be first authorized through a court 
judgment. Given the high number of ICSID awards against Argentina in the past 10 years, this 
non-compliance has put considerable strain on the regime overall. While Argentina has recently 
satisfied many of its outstanding awards through negotiated settlements, some final awards 
remain unsatisfied.  
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In addition to the Argentinian cases, Zimbabwe, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Thailand have 
all refused to comply with any awards rendered against them. 42 In addition, a number of 
respondent states delayed or refused enforcement in individual cases: Guatemala, Kazakhstan, 
Mexico, and Venezuela.43 These states have a record of complying with some awards and 
rigorously fighting enforcement in others.  
Interestingly, in the Russian case, many of the awards rendered against the state have 
been fought in domestic courts through set-aside proceedings, and with substantial success to 
date. So far, all of the awards rendered against Russia in the Yukos saga have been set-aside in 
the domestic courts of Sweden and the Netherlands (the seats of these arbitrations). This appears 
to be an increasingly popular strategy by losing respondent states in ITA: challenge any award 
rendered against it in the domestic courts at the enforcement state of the proceedings. As the 
legitimacy of ITA continues to be questioned, domestic courts are playing an increasing role in 
policing the enforceability of ITA awards that many respondent states believe they should not 
be obligated to pay. As more and more awards enter the pipeline, one could predict that the 
challenge to awards in domestic courts at the enforcement stage of the proceedings will continue 
to increase. 
Process performance 
The process of ITA has been the subject of intense debate. Many critics are concerned that 
arbitration is not the appropriate model of adjudication for the type of public law disputes 
arbitrators in ITA are asked to resolve. The argument against arbitration claims that courts with 
tenured judges provide more institutional safeguards than do ad hoc arbitrators;44 and that these 
safeguards help ensure that international legal disputes of this type are not as susceptible to 
particular forms of bias or other structural incentives that might favor private investors over 
measures taken by the state in the public interest.  
One of the proposed solutions to this critique would be to establish an international 
investment court that would have many design features of the dispute settlement understanding 
(DSU) of the WTO. In September 2015, the European Commission proposed such a solution 
as a substitute to ISDS provisions in future IIAs it signs with third states.45 Such a court-style 
mechanism has now made its way into the EU-Vietnam FTA, the EU-Canada FTA (CETA), 
and has been proposed as part of the ongoing negotiations over the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US. What this investment court system 
(ICS) seeks to accomplish is to do away with the system of party-appointed arbitrators (a 
process that critics claim results in a pro-investor bias due to the perverse incentives that such 
a system creates) and to add an appellate review system that will help reduce the perceived 
inconsistency of investment treaty outcomes. While such a court-type system could possible 
replace ITA in the long-run, there are a number of institutional difficulties that will prevent a 
quick transition to such a system from taking place.46 
                                                      
42 The cases listed in this section only include treaty-based awards (and may not be exhaustive). In addition to the 
states listed, there are a few states that have not complied with contract-based ICSID awards or settlement 
agreements. Primarily, these include: Lao PDR, Dominican Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ukraine, 
and Turkmenistan. See Langford, Behn, and Fauchald, “Backlash and state strategies in international investment 
law.” 
43 Ibid. 
44 See eg, G. Van Harten, Investment treaty arbitration and public law (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
45 European Commission, “Commission Draft Text TTIP – Investment” 16 September 2015 <http://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/doclib/html/153807.htm> accessed 1 August 2017. 
46 Primarily, there are significant costs that will be imposed on states in establishing a standing court for each 
agreement (mostly bilateral) that a state signs. One of the benefits of investment treaty arbitration is that the costs 
for individual cases can be high, but they are significantly less so than the establishment of a permanent court 
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While the proposal for an ICS is garnering significant attention of late, more pragmatic 
considerations in the immediate future might be to reform particular aspects of the processes 
associated with ITA. To assess what these reforms might be, and how they might assist in 
increasing the performance of ITA, this section will look at a few features of treaty-based 
arbitration that have been variously viewed as problematic: (1) issues relating to transparency; 
(2) issues relating to the length of proceedings; and (3) issues relating to a system that favors 
repeat arbitrators. 
Looking first at issues of transparency, there is a significant perception that ITA is a 
secretive process that is conducted behind closed doors with low levels of transparency. This 
critique of the process of ITA has been around for a long time and is premised on the fact that 
many of the institutional design features of investment treaty arbitration are borrowed from 
international commercial arbitration where the default rule is one of confidentiality. 
Transparency in ITA can be divided into two major categories: (1) transparency in the 
proceedings (ie, open hearings); and (2) transparency in the existence of a dispute and in the 
awards rendered. While there are some examples of tribunals opening up their hearings to the 
public (mostly in the context of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR cases), it remains a fairly rare 
occurrence. On the other hand, transparency through publicly available awards is something 
that has been changing rapidly in ITA in recent years. 47  The default assumption of 
confidentiality and secrecy is no longer accurate.  
In regard to the transparency of ITA, it turns out that the likelihood that parties will seek 
to keep proceedings and awards secret is a product of the institutional setting of the arbitration. 
Looking specifically at the institutional distribution of cases, one can see that the majority of 
ITAs registered to date (878 cases) have been administered by ICSID (59%). However, non-
ICSID cases are encroaching on ICSID’s market dominance. It is now that 41% of all ITA cases 
have either been administered with no institutional backing (181 ad hoc UNCITRAL tribunals) 
or they have been administered by either the PCA (94 cases) or a regional international 
commercial arbitration center (76 cases).48  
If an ITA case is administered by ICSID, there is a presumption of transparency and in 
fact there are only about 9% of all ICSID cases that have been resolved to date where the final 
award remains confidential. Furthermore, ICSID also provides a publicly available registry that 
logs all of the cases that have been initiated and resolved. This means for ICSID cases, there is 
public knowledge of the existence of a dispute and the awards in almost all cases are also 
publicly available. The picture of transparency in non-ICSID cases is certainly more opaque 
and without any legal requirement that even the occurrence of a dispute be known to the public, 
there is a much higher likelihood in non-ICSID cases that some disputes will not even be known, 
let alone that an award will be made publicly available. While the number of confidential ICSID 
awards currently hovers around 10%, approximately one-third of all non-ICSID cases are not 
publicly available.  
                                                      
system that might not have many disputes brought before. For example, it may make sense to establish a permanent 
court for the TTIP, but less so under a Norway-Mozambique BIT. A long-term alternative to bilateral court system 
would be to establish a multilateral framework that would cover all existing IIAs.  
47 As of April 2014, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration came into 
effect (but will only cover arbitrations based on IIAs signed after 1 April 2014) <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html> accessed 1 August 2017. Further, in March 2015, the Mauritius 
Convention on Transparency opened for signatures. As of 1 August 2017, 18 states have signed the convention 
(with only one ratification) <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convent 
ion.html> accessed 1 August 2017. 
48 The SCC is the most frequently used international commercial arbitration center (41 fully resolved disputes), 
followed by the ICC (four fully resolved disputes), the LCIA (four fully resolved disputes), the Moscow Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (MCCI) (three fully resolved disputes), and the Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) (two fully resolved disputes).  
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Overall, out of the 388 ITA cases that have reached a final award, 76% (or 294 awards) 
are publicly available. However, this is only the number for known cases. In other words, there 
may be a number of non-ICSID cases that are not even known (because there is no formal 
registry for these cases). The chances of this being a large number is fairly low though; 
knowledge about most cases (and who won the case), even if the awards are not made public, 
increasingly get leaked into the public domain at some point.  
One issue in relation to transparency that is interesting to look at is which parties might 
be seeking to keep awards in particular cases confidential. Of the 24% of cases whose awards 
remain confidential (94 cases), the claimant-investors won 62 of these cases (66%) and lost in 
32 cases. Of the 76% of cases that are publicly available, the claimant-investor won 137 of these 
cases (46%) and lost in 157 cases. These descriptive statistics suggest that cases where the 
claimant-investor wins are, on average, more likely to be kept confidential. Without 
investigating the circumstances of these cases more closely, one could speculate that 
confidentiality in ITA may not be driven by claimant-investors but by respondent states seeking 
to keep awards in losing cases confidential.49  Respondent states may want to minimize the 
fallout that could come from the details of a loss becoming public knowledge. 
The next procedural performance issue to discuss is the length of proceedings in ITA. 
Examining figure 3.10, it becomes readily apparent that these disputes take a long time to 
resolve. On average, ITAs take over three and a half years to resolve in the first instance. This 
does not include the amount of time that is often spent at the enforcement stage of the 
proceedings in domestic courts (which can take upwards of five years depending on the number 
of appellate review stages that are possible in a particular domestic system) or through the 
annulment process in ICSID cases (average of about two years). Further, if an ICSID case is 
annulled by an ad hoc annulment committee, it is possible for the case to be re-submitted again 
as a first instance tribunal. There are a number of examples of ITAs of this type taking in excess 
of 10 years to become finally resolved. It is unknown whether an ICS as proposed by the 
European Commission would reduce the length of proceedings in investment treaty cases 
because the current ITA system does not have a formal appellate review process. Adding such 
a process through a court system would theoretically add significant time to any dispute.   
Figure 3.10 Average length of ITA proceedings (in years) 
 
Source: PITAD through 1 August 2017 
Further, those who believe that ITA should be a faster alternative to using domestic 
courts charge that the amount of time taken to resolve a dispute is problematic. Certainly, it is 
difficult to argue that ITA is faster than many domestic courts. However, making such analogies 
                                                      
49 The assumption here is that a winning claimant-investor has a lower incentive to keep a case confidential and 
that given the overall win rate for claimant-investors in cases where awards remain confidential is significantly 
higher (66%) than the overall win rate for claimant-investors (45%) in all cases, it may be that respondent states 
do not want to make these awards publicly available.  
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is a possible misnomer because ITA has very little in common with the types of arbitration that 
tend to be more efficient and faster than domestic courts (ie, employment arbitration or 
consumer contract arbitration). In fact, ITA cases can often be more complex and time intensive 
than the vast majority of domestic court litigation. Many ITAs produce thousands of pages of 
factual evidence and awards can easily run into the hundreds of pages. It is therefore 
unsurprising that typically ITA cases take a long time to resolve. However, the type of disputes 
that ITA appears to favor (large, complex litigation) undermines the possibility for any type of 
small claims mechanism to develop. In terms of performance and legitimacy, ITA would benefit 
from a process that would allow relatively small investments and investors to use the system. 
Currently, ITA – for reasons of both time and expense – is de facto foreclosed to foreign 
investors with claims smaller than about 10 million USD.  
The final issue relating to the process performance of ITA is to empirically assess the 
system of party-appointments and the repeat appointment of a small cadre of arbitrators. ITA 
is built, procedurally, on the system developed in the context of international commercial 
arbitration. The default rule is that each party to the dispute appoints an arbitrator and the 
president of the tribunal is then appointed by agreement of either the two co-arbitrators or the 
parties. For most cases, this default rule works well. However, such a process is often charged 
as being incapable of impartiality because the very nature of an appointment-based system is to 
appoint an arbitrator that the party believes is most likely to support her version of the case. But 
what most critics fail to realize is that one party to the dispute is not picking all three arbitrators 
on a tribunal; rather they only get to pick one. This means that actually there is very little 
possibility for one of the party-appointed arbitrators on a tribunal to excessively influence the 
outcome. Further, and in practice, it is the president of the tribunal that is tasked with making 
the ultimate decision in a particular dispute.  
As such, the party-appointed arbitrators may play less of a role in the final outcome than 
is often assumed. Nonetheless, one of the biggest complaints about ITA is its system of party-
appointed arbitrators. The alternative to such a system is to either convert to a court-style system 
with permanent tenured judges resolving disputes or for a system of institutional appointments  
In addition to problems with the system of party-appointed arbitrators is the system of 
repeat appointments. ITA is increasingly dominated by a small group of elite arbitrators that 
are repeatedly selected by parties in the vast majority of disputes. To date, in the 878 cases that 
have been registered, there have been 652 different arbitrators that have accepted appointments 
in these cases (this does not include the 152 pending cases where no arbitrators have been 
selected yet). Of these 652 different arbitrators, over half (350) of them have sat in only one 
case. However, while these one-time arbitrators are in the clear majority, it is the numbers of 
repeat-appointed arbitrators that is interesting. There is a large percentage of arbitrators (32%), 
constituting 208 individuals, who have been appointed between two and nine times in ITA 
cases; and there are 63 arbitrators that have 10 or more appointments. The most fantastic 
statistic in this regard is that these 63 arbitrators have taken 58% of all possible appointments 
in fully constituted ITA cases to date (722 cases). It is clear that there is a core group of 
arbitrators that dominate in investment treaty arbitration.50  
One of the main issues with the high clustering of repeat arbitrators in ITAs is that charge 
that there is a dearth of diversity among those gaining repeat appointments. Of the 652 
arbitrators appointed to date, 68% of them have nationalities from states in either North 
America or Western Europe. Further, only 4% of all arbitrators are women.51 Considering that 
the majority of ITA cases are against states in the developing world, the fact that so many 
arbitrators are from the global North and so few are women is problematic. Overall, it appears 
                                                      
50 The two most often appointed ITA arbitrators are Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler (48) and Brigitte Stern (87). 
51 The irony here is that only 38 women have been appointed as arbitrators in ITA cases but the two most often 
appointed arbitrators (accounting for 135 appointments combined) are women. 
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that ITA does in fact have a diversity problem, but it is unclear how a structural shift to a court 
system or a system of institutional appointments would improve the diversity of the system. In 
fact, it may even exasperate the problem by drastically reducing the number of individuals 
eligible to sit on investment treaty tribunals (ie, the ICS proposal calls for 15 individuals to 
accept permanent appointments).  
Conclusions 
Assessing the overall performance of an entire system of adjudication within the confines of a 
short book chapter is no easy task. What this contribution has sought to provide is an overview 
of the entire system of ITA as it has been practiced to date. The effect of such an exercise was 
to highlight some of the performance deficits that have occurred in its practice and to objectively 
assess (with empirical evidence) the overall performance of ITA in terms of its historical 
purpose.  
One of the problems with objectively assessing the performance of ITA is that it is a 
system of adjudication with a high degree of normative polarization whereby most issues are 
evaluated through a normative lens. For many, ITA has been in a legitimacy crisis for the past 
decade and debates about the use and legitimacy (and performance) of ITA often turn into 
heated exchanges about issues of unfairness and unjustness in global economic governance 
more generally. For critics of the regime, no performance benchmarks are worthy: the system 
is rotten and should be dismantled. For those with more moderate views, ITA does in fact seem 
to be performing its functions fairly well, especially when viewed in terms of historical purpose.  
In fact, this contribution highlights that one area where ITA could improve its 
performance is through increased access. One of the main deficits identified is that there are too 
few foreign investors with access to legal protections that can be enforced through binding 
arbitration. Such a finding would actually call for an expansion of ITA, not its constriction. In 
terms of the process of ITA, this chapter identified that while becoming increasingly 
transparent, disputes take a long time to resolve and that there appears to be a severe lack of 
diversity among the arbitrators appointed to sit on tribunals. In terms of outcomes, the most 
problematic issue in regards to its performance is that, while the win-loss ratios overall appear 
fairly balanced, there seems to be a bias against developing states that is unlikely to be 
justifiable.  
Overall, assessing ITA in terms of its performance has provided a neutral framework 
for evaluating a system of adjudication on objective, empirically-based terms. Such an approach 
is valuable in identifying where ITA can be improved. While arguably flawed in certain 
respects, investment treaty arbitration does seem to be serving a valuable function and should 
be worthy of reform. Such reforms might eventually lead to a system of adjudication that takes 
the form of a standing international court or one that is based on a multilateral treaty where 
issues of access and balance between states and investors can be fine-tuned and improved. 
However, given the problems that ITA has sought to address in the aggregate (ie, the historical 
problem of enforcing rights for foreign aliens investing abroad), ITA does appear to be 
performing commensurate with its historic purpose. 
